SECURITYAugust 11, 2026

UAE-Saudi rivalry amid the war with Iran

Giorgio Cafiero 

Reading time: 9 min

The UAE’s strategic choices deepen rivalry with Saudi Arabia, testing Gulf unity against shared security threats.

This article is the first in a two-part GIS series, “The UAE in focus.” Part two will be available on August 12.

Since the Arab Spring uprisings broke out in the early 2010s, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has asserted itself as an independent actor on the international stage. Its foreign policy has grown increasingly bold, pragmatic and autonomous, driven by a determination to advance Emirati national interests as understood by the ruling elites in Abu Dhabi. While the UAE continues to cooperate closely with partners in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and the Arab League when doing so aligns with its priorities, it has also shown a willingness to diverge from established Gulf and Arab consensus, often positioning itself as a regional outlier and, at times, a trendsetter.

This trajectory has been evident in many domains: its sponsorship of the Southern Transitional Council (STC) in Yemen since its formation in 2017, the restoration of diplomatic ties with the former Syrian government led by Bashar al-Assad in 2018, its entry into the Abraham Accords in 2020, support for the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) throughout the ongoing Sudanese conflict (2023-present), and its exit from the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and OPEC+ in 2026. Recent speculation that the UAE may become the first Arab League member state to recognize Somaliland’s self-declared independence – as Israel did last December – underscores Abu Dhabi’s continued readiness to chart an independent course, even when that departs from Saudi and broader Arab positions.

Some of the UAE’s recent actions on the international stage have strained its relations with Saudi Arabia, fueling a rivalry that has spilled across multiple regional theaters and weakened Gulf Arab unity. A view held in Riyadh and other Arab capitals is that the UAE has worked with Israel in an “axis of fragmentation,” supporting non-state and sub-state actors in weak (if not failed) states at the expense of their territorial integrity and the security interests of influential countries in the region. Emirati officials deny that they are deliberately destabilizing other countries, and maintain that the UAE’s alignment with Israel is more selective and less automatic than some of Abu Dhabi’s critics allege.

These evolving circumstances could create a genuine opportunity for Riyadh and Abu Dhabi to mend ties and establish a more unified front against the Houthis and Tehran.

Tehran’s retaliatory strikes against GCC states following the outbreak of the American-Israeli war on Iran in late February 2026 briefly drew Abu Dhabi and Riyadh closer after months of escalating disputes over the Horn of Africa, Sudan and Yemen. But the conflict with the Islamic Republic ultimately failed to bridge their differences. Instead, it underscored a widening divide between the UAE, on one side, and Saudi Arabia, Oman and Qatar on the other.

Nonetheless, with the war entering a new phase − marked by intermittent ceasefires and a shift in the conflict’s center of gravity toward Yemen, the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and the Red Sea − the Kingdom faces mounting threats to its vital economic and geopolitical interests. These evolving circumstances could create a genuine opportunity for Riyadh and Abu Dhabi to mend ties and establish a more unified front against the Houthis and Tehran. Indeed, on July 21, senior Saudi and Emirati officials issued coordinated social media statements reaffirming the two countries’ deep historical bonds, shared destiny and the guidance of their respective leaderships, signaling a public display of unity after months of friction in bilateral affairs.

Israel-UAE alignment in the current era

Although the UAE, like other GCC members, opposed the United States and Israel’s decision to launch the war on Iran in late February, once hostilities began, Abu Dhabi ultimately aligned more closely than any Arab capital with the U.S. and Israel. It conducted its own military operations against Iranian targets and unsuccessfully sought to draw Saudi Arabia and Qatar into similar action. Pakistan’s mediation efforts, which position Islamabad as a bridge between Washington and Tehran, are viewed unfavorably in Abu Dhabi. Emirati officials believed the initial conflict should have continued longer to further degrade Iran’s capabilities before any ceasefire came into effect.

The “Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding,” signed by the Trump administration and Iran on June 14, has failed to bring an end to the conflict, with the U.S. attacking Iran, Tehran launching missile and drone strikes against a host of Arab nations, and Israeli military actions continuing in Lebanon. Regional intermediaries − chiefly Oman, Qatar and Pakistan – had been seeking to shore up the MoU to make the ceasefire more durable. However, following a pause in attacks and counter-attacks in late July, conflict resumed before Mr. Trump backed down from threats to severely escalate strikes on Iran on August 1 on the grounds that Washington and Tehran were moving “rapidly” toward a deal. Whether a stable and lasting solution is found or full-fledged war resumes is a major source of uncertainty.

Even if a lasting agreement emerges, sustained by Washington pressuring Israel to show some degree of restraint, Israel would likely to revert to a “shadow war” strategy against Iran. This form of indirect confrontation, marked by cyber operations, intelligence activity and proxy engagements, echoes the pre-2024 period when both states engaged in what Israel termed the “war between the wars.” Given Abu Dhabi’s increasingly close alignment with Israel over shared concerns about Iran, it is possible that the UAE will tacitly support Israel in such a shadow conflict. This trajectory risks deepening friction within the GCC, particularly with Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Oman, which favor non-aggression frameworks with Iran and view Israel as a regional destabilizer, especially after the unprecedented Israeli attack on Doha in September 2025.

At the same time, the UAE is engaging Iran diplomatically, reportedly in an effort to reach a rapprochement. As Iranian missile and drone attacks on GCC states have mostly focused on Bahrain and Kuwait − not the UAE − since the Islamabad MoU went into effect, Abu Dhabi may be eyeing an opportunity to reduce tensions with Tehran. Mindful of economic ties between Iran and the UAE, such a de-escalation would serve the UAE’s business and commercial interests, particularly Dubai, despite Abu Dhabi’s mostly security-first approach to the Islamic Republic.

Israel’s role in Gulf security and diverging GCC threat perceptions

A growing fault line within the GCC concerns Israel’s role in the Gulf’s security architecture. For Abu Dhabi, Israel’s military support during Iranian missile and drone attacks has bolstered the UAE’s perceptions of Israel as a dependable partner. Emirati officials, fairly or not, believe most Arab and Islamic states failed to assist the UAE during the war, while Israel’s deployment of missile defense systems and personnel significantly shaped Abu Dhabi’s assessment of which states it can count on in times of national security crises.

Closely aligned with Abu Dhabi and a signatory of the Abraham Accords since 2020, Bahrain is likely to continue viewing Israel as a key security partner against Iranian threats. Kuwait’s trajectory is less certain, and while the conventional wisdom is that Kuwait is unusually resistant to normalization of ties with Israel, it may proceed in that direction, driven by Iranian aggression and growing Emirati influence within Kuwaiti policymaking circles.

Saudi Arabia, together with Qatar and Oman, is expected to pursue a strategy of accommodation with Iran, emphasizing diplomacy and dialogue over confrontation. These states also view Abu Dhabi’s deepening ties with Israel as increasingly problematic, particularly if it leads to a more durable Israeli military footprint on the Arabian Peninsula.  

The Horn of Africa and Emirati-Israeli coordination

The evolution of Emirati-Israeli coordination beyond the Gulf, particularly in the Horn of Africa, warrants close attention. Following the UAE’s loss of influence in southern Yemen earlier this year amid the Southern Transitional Council’s significant setbacks, Abu Dhabi is likely to place even greater emphasis on advancing its interests on the African side of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and the Red Sea. This will safeguard its position along these critical maritime chokepoints and shipping lanes.

Should the UAE follow Israel and move to recognize Somaliland’s independence, Israeli-Emirati alignment could deepen in that breakaway territory and possibly result in growing coordination between Abu Dhabi and Israel in other parts of the Horn of Africa. Such developments would place the UAE further at odds with Saudi Arabia and the other three members of the “Islamic Quad” (Egypt, Pakistan and Turkiye), all of which strongly support Somalia’s territorial integrity, and would likely further intensifying intra-GCC tensions.

Reordering the Gulf and the limits of alignment

The trajectory of Emirati foreign policy often reflects Abu Dhabi’s divergence from traditional Gulf consensus. While the GCC has historically provided a framework for security, disputes over Iran, Israel and regional crises have recently exposed deep fractures, including some that have been long simmering.

Read more by Giorgio Cafiero

• Ukraine’s strategic leap into Gulf security
• Azerbaijan’s strategic reentry into post-Assad Syria
• U.S.-Saudi transactional ties and strategic ambitions

Throughout the remainder of 2026 and beyond, the UAE will need to calculate the risks of intensifying its rivalry with Saudi Arabia and challenging regional consensuses on sensitive issues. For Abu Dhabi, it will be necessary to strike a balance between maintaining stable ties with other Arab capitals such as Cairo, Doha, Muscat and Riyadh and its own desire for an increasingly autonomous foreign policy.

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