High-stakes diplomacy in U.S.-Iran standoff
Escalating U.S.-Iran tensions lead to military threats and economic risks, despite fragile, indirect talks.
In a nutshell
- The U.S. is pressuring a weakened Tehran for a nuclear deal
- Regional mediators support diplomacy to avert devastating conflict
- Israel favors military action; Gulf states fear economic fallout, security risks
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In early 2026, American military threats against Iran and renewed diplomatic engagement between the two countries have been at the center of global attention. With Iran and its so-called Axis of Resistance significantly weakened since 2024, and domestic unrest crippling the country since December 2025, the administration of United States President Donald Trump appears to see an opportunity to extract concessions aligned with Washington’s interests.
Both sides are contributing to the brinkmanship. The White House has amassed military might near Iran and is set to have a second aircraft carrier in the region so it can take military action if negotiations fail. For its part, Tehran is turning to military displays with, for example, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) beginning military drills in the Strait of Hormuz on February 16, during which it temporarily closed the waterway to commercial shipping. Subsequently, Iran and Russia said they began joint military exercises in the in the Gulf of Oman and the Indian Ocean. There have also been unconfirmed reports that Chinese naval vessels were to join.
Iran’s neighbors are intensifying efforts to de-escalate tensions, offering diplomatic offramps and attempting to steer Washington and Tehran away from the dangerous standoff. Several Middle Eastern states and Switzerland are serving as intermediaries between the U.S. and Iran.
As a mediator, the Sultanate of Oman hosted U.S.-Iran talks in Muscat on February 6. A second round of indirect negotiations between the two countries took place under Omani auspices in Geneva on February 17, leading Iranian representatives to say that within two weeks Tehran will put detailed nuclear proposals on the table. Shortly after this round of talks in Switzerland, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi optimistically stated that “a new window has opened” for Washington and Tehran to reach an agreement.
The willingness of both the American and Iranian sides to negotiate, even indirectly, indicates their preferences, at least for now, for diplomacy over armed confrontation. Egypt, Qatar and Turkiye are also working to create space for dialogue to avert a fresh conflict.
Regional perspectives
Oman has the longest and most consistent record among Gulf Cooperation Council members of mediating and facilitating dialogue between Iran and its adversaries. Muscat has played this role since the 1980s. The trust Tehran places in Oman is a key reason why Iran moved the first round of talks from Istanbul to Muscat. Given that Muscat was also the location for negotiations before Israel’s strikes on Iran in June 2025, holding the February 6 talks in the Omani capital allowed Tehran to project continuity and diplomatic resolve.
Both rounds of talks in February focused exclusively on the nuclear issue, despite the White House initially seeking a broader agenda including Iran’s ballistic missile program and its support for regional actors such as Lebanon’s Hezbollah and the Houthis in Yemen. The Trump administration was ultimately willing to compromise and agreed to talks with the topic of negotiations unchanged from discussions in Muscat and Rome last year: uranium enrichment.
After the Trump administration agreed to the reduced scope of discussions, Iranian officials said they were ready to explore a compromise.
Mr. Araghchi has described Iran’s right to enrichment as “inalienable,” while the Trump administration insists on zero enrichment. Despite the two extremes, ahead of this year’s second round of talks and after the Trump administration agreed to the reduced scope of discussions, Iranian officials said they were ready to explore a compromise.
Since the start of this year, Mr. Araghchi and Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty have maintained close contact, with Cairo emphasizing the need to ease tensions to preserve regional equilibrium. Despite the absence of formal diplomatic relations with Iran, Egypt is an active proponent of dialogue.
Qatar plays a role in these diplomatic efforts as well. Foreign Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman al-Thani’s sustained engagement with Iranian officials in Doha and Tehran highlights Qatar’s intent to leverage its close alliance with Washington and pragmatic ties with Tehran to avert regional war. Sharing the world’s largest gas field with Iran and relying heavily on the Strait of Hormuz, Doha has especially high economic stakes in stability prevailing. As the host of the U.S. Central Command’s forward headquarters at al-Udeid Air Base, Qatar is also acutely aware of the risks of becoming entangled in a future U.S.-Iran conflict, as it was on June 23, 2025.
Turkiye is the only NATO member bordering Iran. Bound by historical, geographic, economic and security ties, Ankara and Tehran’s complicated relationship can be best understood as a cooperative rivalry. Despite Ankara consistently opposing key elements of Tehran’s regional and foreign policies, such as the Islamic Republic’s support for Syria’s former regime, it has just as firmly rejected the use of military force against Iran’s nuclear program. Instead, Turkiye has long championed diplomatic solutions to the Iranian nuclear issue, including its efforts alongside Brazil during the first Obama administration.
Earlier this year, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan stepped up engagement with Tehran and the Trump administration, pressing for reciprocal concessions to avert a conflict that Turkish officials fear would further destabilize an already fragile Middle East. Although Ankara may prefer an Iran with diminished regional clout, it views state collapse or fragmentation as dangerous. Given their shared border, Turkish policymakers are deeply concerned about the prospect of large-scale refugee flows into Turkiye. Ankara also fears that the collapse of the Iranian nation-state could embolden Iran’s Kurdish population to pursue greater autonomy, if not outright independence, inspiring its own Kurdish minority to do the same.
Israeli interests
Although Oman, Egypt, Qatar and Turkiye have worked to prevent a U.S.-Iran military confrontation, Israel has pursued a markedly different course. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government is convinced that the American-Israeli alliance in June 2025 fell short of fully achieving Israel’s wartime objectives, which includes but is not limited to the complete elimination of all enriched uranium and nuclear facilities in Iran. Tel Aviv favors a renewed and more intense, sustained U.S. military campaign against Iran, with the additional aim of toppling the Islamic Republic.
Israel was a leading advocate against the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), known as the Iran nuclear deal (an agreement between Iran and the five permanent UN Security Council members plus Germany), even before its watershed passage in mid-2015. During the first Trump administration, Israel joined Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates in lobbying the White House to abandon the JCPOA. Tel Aviv has consistently resisted any diplomatic arrangement between Washington and Tehran that would allow Iran to achieve sanctions relief without meeting Israel’s demands on nuclear and non-nuclear issues, which are unacceptable to Iran.
Escalation risks and economic priorities
Regional efforts to prevent a wider conflict do not reflect any country’s alignment with Iran’s foreign policy, with which many states have serious disagreements. Rather, these actors share a stark assessment of the dangers posed by additional U.S. or Israeli military strikes on Iran, which they believe could rapidly escalate into a regionwide conflagration with a much higher risk of casualties. Many leaders in the region fear that renewed warfare in 2026 could far exceed the scale and destruction of the June 2025 conflict, potentially lasting much longer than 12 days.
Given that many regional states have close security partnerships with Washington and host U.S. military facilities, they take Iranian threats to target such installations in counterattacks seriously. The Iranian missile and drone strike on the U.S.’s al-Udeid Air Base in Qatar in June 2025, though calibrated and pre-signaled, underscored how vulnerable Iran’s neighbors are to Tehran’s wrath.
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Iran also wields leverage over the Strait of Hormuz, through which it could severely disrupt global energy markets. Although closing this strait or even obstructing the transit of gas and oil through it would severely harm Iran’s own economy, Tehran may take such an action in an extreme scenario. For Bahrain, Kuwait and Qatar, which rely on the strait to export gas and oil, any closure or obstruction would devastate their hydrocarbon-dependent economies. Preventing this outcome is therefore a paramount priority not only for Gulf monarchies, but also for many energy-importing countries worldwide, especially in the Far East.
Despite Hezbollah’s humiliating losses and the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in 2024, Tehran retains a network of regional partners and surrogates capable of retaliating against attacks on Iranian territory. The Houthis in Yemen remain the most potent of these actors, raising acute concerns about disruptions to global trade through the Gulf of Aden, Red Sea and Bab el-Mandab Strait. While Iraq’s pro-Iranian factions have thus far refrained from entering the regional fray in the period following October 7, 2023, a renewed U.S.-Iran conflict could draw them in, particularly amid shifting domestic dynamics with the nomination of Nouri al-Maliki for prime minister, risking the exacerbation of turmoil in Iraq.
Countries facilitating and mediating U.S.-Iran talks harbor no illusions about the depth of mistrust between Washington and Tehran, nor do they endorse Iran’s regional conduct. The diplomacy instead reflects sober assessments of the immense political, economic and security costs of potential renewed conflict. By offering channels for dialogue and de-escalation, they seek to avert a disastrous outcome.
Scenarios
Most likely: No war and competing claims of victory
Open conflict is avoided and both Washington and Tehran claim success. The White House will likely present a limited arrangement with Iran – one that falls well short of the scope and ambition of the JCPOA – as a significant diplomatic achievement.
While such an understanding would not resolve the core drivers of U.S.-Iran tensions, it would reduce the immediate risk of military escalation. Consistent with the approach of the first and second Trump administrations toward conflict “resolution,” such as Serbia-Kosovo, Armenia-Azerbaijan or the Houthi operations in the Red Sea, the agreement would be framed domestically as an accomplishment made possible by Mr. Trump’s negotiating style.
However, the administration is unlikely to sustain the political focus or discipline required to address the structural sources of Iran-related tensions. As a result, the arrangement would function primarily as a stopgap measure, temporarily sparing the region from armed conflict while deferring unresolved issues to future U.S. administrations.
Less likely: Limited U.S. military strikes and regional escalation
If, after the second round of negotiations, the U.S. and Iran are still at odds, the likelihood of escalation increases. Under sustained pressure from both the pro-Israel lobby in the U.S. and Mr. Netanyahu, the Trump administration conducts targeted attacks against Iranian nuclear, missile and military facilities, stating that Tehran’s refusal to accept a zero-enrichment framework left it no choice but to attack Iran.
Intense Iranian retaliation directed at Israel would trigger a second round of direct hostilities between Tehran and Tel Aviv. Such an escalation has severe regional repercussions, with destabilizing effects extending across the Gulf states, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria and Yemen. While intended as a constrained use of force, this scenario exacerbates regional volatility, surpassing what was seen in June 2025.
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