A new era is dawning in Japan-U.S. relations
As China’s influence in the Far East grows, recent elections in Japan and the U.S. highlight the countries’ contrasting political and security trajectories.
In a nutshell
- The U.S.-Japan alliance has been a cornerstone of Asian peace and security
- Differing political winds in both countries may force a new security paradigm
- Amid China’s rise, the alliance’s future is being assessed and reconsidered
By coincidence, national elections in Japan and the United States were held at around the same time in late 2024. In the U.S., the election date was a given. In Japan, the general election to the lower house of parliament came one year ahead of schedule due to the early dissolution of the second chamber. A crisis-ridden coalition government run by both the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), Japan’s largest political party with a conservative outlook, and Komeito, a centrist party, had lost public support and had no alternative to prematurely dissolving the lower house and calling a snap election, which it lost by a decisive margin.
Votes in both countries produced results of far-reaching significance: in the case of President-elect Donald Trump, a popular majority and outright victory supported by his Republican Party winning control of both houses of Congress; in the case of Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba, a hung parliament with no party securing a majority in the country’s 465-seat lower house.
While Mr. Trump can govern with tight control over all three branches of government for the next four years, Mr. Ishiba must lead a minority coalition that is vulnerable to being toppled. Contrasting U.S. citizens clearly voting for change to conservative governance, Japan faces instability and is on the verge of returning to “revolving door governments” where prime ministers hardly last a full term. No less than 55 prime ministers have held office since the capitulation of Japan on August 15, 1945.
U.S. and Japan, then and now
Today’s political climate is very different than it was eight years ago when President Trump began his first term in the White House. In November 2016, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe (2006-2007, 2012-2020), who was tragically assassinated on July 8, 2022, was granted the honor of being the first foreign leader to meet the president-elect in Trump Tower in New York City. Abe was in the midst of his record-breaking uninterrupted eight years of leadership, during which he fundamentally changed the image of Japan in the world and, most notably, among conservative Americans. Mr. Trump’s relationship with Abe during his entire first term was stable and close, marking a recent high point in the U.S.-Japan relationship.
Despite Abe failing in his attempt to abolish Article 9 of the Japanese constitution (which broadly commits Japan to pacifism), President Trump saw him as a powerful and successful leader. The American president counted the Japanese prime minister among a select group of international politicians whom he respected and trusted. Abe gained unusual personal access, which usually proves elusive to most Japanese politicians when dealing with foreign leaders.
Compare that to the current situation, with President-elect Trump preparing for his second presidency, and Prime Minister Ishiba being a newcomer with only a few months at the helm of government. In November 2024, Tokyo sought a bilateral meeting for Mr. Ishiba with Mr. Trump following the G20 summit in Rio de Janeiro and the leadership meeting of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation in Lima. The president-elect’s office, however, declined, saying he was too busy and did not have time to meet Mr. Ishiba. That can be considered a diplomatic snub, leaving a bad taste and fueling speculation of a potential downgrading of U.S.-Japan relations. In contrast, China and Japan appear increasingly open to improving relations with each other. At the November 15 event in Lima where Mr. Trump rebuffed the Japanese leader’s offer to meet, Chinese President Xi Jinping found time for a bilateral meeting with Prime Minister Ishiba.
Ample room for improvement
By the usual standards of interaction between the leaders of important countries, the relationship between Mr. Trump and Abe was extraordinary. It was based on their personalities. Both were unconventional politicians in their own country who had to deal with abuse by the opposition and mainstream media. Abe could not match the colorful character of President Trump, but by Japanese standards, he had unusually strong character traits and tended to be outspoken. Most importantly, from an American point of view, Abe was willing to project Japan as a confident power, inclined to promote its interests and even to project Japan’s military strength and resoluteness in the world.
There was a geostrategic convergence between the two leaders. President Trump, in his endeavor to make America’s allies do more for their defense and increase their share in security institutions, saw a valuable ally in Prime Minister Abe. Abe himself enhanced Japan’s geopolitical engagements and made clear to his compatriots the need to strengthen Japan’s profile as a significant regional power with corresponding military assets.
Abe recognized that in defense preparedness, there was scope to improve Japan’s track record, which led to boosting defense spending, expanding the number of troops and enhancing branches of military such as the navy. Prior to that, Japan had kept a low profile in military terms, relying on its special relationship with Washington under the American nuclear umbrella.
Potential discrepancies and eventual outcomes
The almost seven decades of LDP governance were built on a concise, pragmatic program to make Japan a wealthy country, pursuing conservative nationalism and adhering to a firm alliance with the U.S. These aims, which form part of the specific Japanese social contract, were perfectly tailored for the Cold War and even for the short years of globalization following the demise of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991.
Yet amid the rise of China and since the February 2022 outbreak of the war in Ukraine, it has become self-evident in Tokyo that Japan must adjust to an emerging new world order, particularly as regards national security and alliances. In this respect are two towering challenges for the years to come.
It has become self-evident in Tokyo that Japan must adjust to an emerging new world order.
The first challenge is political instability, which has been a significant issue in Japan. In the early 2000s, the LDP seemed to be losing its dominant influence and was referred to as a “spent force.” This period led many to believe that a new era of opposition was beginning, where other parties might take the lead. Then, under Abe’s leadership, the LDP, Japan’s grand old party, made an impressive comeback. However, after he retired as party leader and prime minister in September 2020, the party once again showed cracks and a return to age-old factionalism.
That descent ended in the party’s defeat in November 2024, when it failed to secure a majority, though it remains the largest party in parliament. This drubbing was punishment for a series of scandals linked to the LDP and, most notably, to former Prime Minister Fumio Kishida (2021-2024). Today’s LDP-Komeito coalition finds itself in the unenviable situation of lacking a majority in the lower house. Additionally, in July 2025, when some seats in the upper house will be up for election, an early change in national government could follow. Currently, it looks as if Prime Minister Ishiba may not hold office for long, and will instead join the lengthy list of “revolving door prime ministers.”
Read more from Asian affairs expert Urs Schöttli
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The second challenge is that the uncertainty in Tokyo is precisely what the incoming U.S. president dislikes and seeks to avoid. While Japan has clearly put more emphasis on its security and may allot additional resources to this end in coming years due to external pressures, in the near term, it will have difficulty papering over the growing discrepancies between the two countries. On the one hand, it is the declared goal of the Trump administration to put American interests first, and on the other, there is a similar Japanese commitment to its own interests – yet Tokyo currently lacks the wherewithal to implement such policy without the help of its American ally.
This fraught situation is not mere speculation about a distant future. A breaking point could soon become reality, for example in the event of a conflict surrounding Taiwan or conflagrations in the South China Sea. Questions being raised in both capitals include to what extent the U.S. will support Asia-Pacific allies, and whether Washington is willing to engage militarily in the region. Tokyo will pay great attention to other crises in the world and note how the Trump administration manages them. Among the Japanese, there is a lingering, worrying concern that the U.S., under the mercurial President Trump, could make a deal with China behind the back of its ally Japan.
Scenarios
Least likely: U.S.-Japan relations continue with no course correction
The least likely scenario, a continuation of the status quo, is based on a continuation of the post-World War II precept viewing Japan as an “unsinkable aircraft carrier.” In this scenario, the U.S. can continue the containment of China and project its military might in the Far East, on the high seas and on the Korean Peninsula. This scenario rests on a conservative understanding of what risks emanate from the Asia-Pacific region and the relative threat levels they present to the American mainland.
Somewhat likely: Japan boosts military spending but remains under the U.S. umbrella
A more likely scenario sees a considerable increase in Japan’s military, financial and political engagement for its own security. This implies the country is carrying a much heavier burden than had been the case until now. At the same time, Tokyo still needs to assume that its security is closely tied to U.S. interests. If a conflict erupts in the Far East, the U.S. would likely prioritize its own safety.
Very likely: Japan aims for self-sufficiency in defense, raises geopolitical stature
A very likely scenario is a decisive expansion of Japanese efforts to strengthen its military, security and diplomatic assets to not only satisfy American demands but also to gain strategic strength and balance in the U.S.-Japanese alliance. As a result, Tokyo will, over time, bolster its own military deterrence, achieve a greater say in decisions about war and peace in the Far East and expand its options for heightened engagement with China.
Certain: China’s role in Far East security grows and Japan takes note
The above scenarios largely depend on the security assessments made by all actors involved, not only the U.S. and its allies but also their adversaries, namely China. There can be no doubt that the country now most significantly influencing peace and stability in Asia and throughout the Far East is the People’s Republic of China. Tokyo knows that in the long run, Japan’s security and prosperity will survive only if China is integrated into the emerging world order as a responsible contributor and actor.
Tokyo is also aware that the relevance of China vis-a-vis Japan is going to increase, bearing in mind Japan’s rapidly growing demographic challenge. Japan knows its future can and probably must include substantial improvements in Sino-Japanese relations. There is already a tradition among a number of LDP politicians to be accommodating to China. Of course, in case of a lasting reduction of tensions between Tokyo and Beijing, it would then be up to Washington to review its alliance with Japan, potentially resulting in Washington being more accommodating to Japan or, conversely, scaling back its commitment.
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