Venezuela’s uneven transition from Maduro
Washington has pulled Venezuela into its orbit, unlocking oil exports, sanctions relief and mineral access even as the political transition stalls.
In a nutshell
- Maduro’s capture delivered the U.S. oil, minerals and security cooperation
- The interim government has conceded little to the opposition
- Reconstruction will shape the success of the transition
- For comprehensive insights, tune into our AI-powered podcast here
The capture of former Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro on January 3, 2026 set off a series of changes best summed up by U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who told members of Congress in June that since the operation, Venezuela no longer poses the same threat to the United States.
Under American tutelage, the U.S. diplomatic presence has been reestablished, enabling cooperation on security and intelligence. Territorial control has been partially regained from drug traffickers, guerrillas and the Tren de Aragua criminal network. Cuban and Iranian influence has been reduced. Macroeconomic indicators have improved on the back of rising oil production, and the first steps toward a democratic transition have been taken.
Other areas are progressing more slowly. The regime continues to maintain control over institutions, and macroeconomic improvements have not yet translated into lower inflation, higher wages or the restoration of public services.
The devastating earthquakes that struck northern Venezuela in late June have become the first major test of the interim regime’s ability to govern. The initial response exposed the same institutional weaknesses that have slowed the transition: poor emergency preparedness and politicized decision-making.
Mr. Rubio himself acknowledges that Venezuela remains far from democracy, noting that the country still lacks the conditions for free elections and continues to hold hundreds of political prisoners.
The U.S. returns to Venezuela
Following Mr. Maduro’s capture, Washington moved quickly and on several fronts. CIA Director John Ratcliffe made the first visit on January 15, meeting interim President Delcy Rodriguez to discuss intelligence cooperation and the need to ensure that Venezuela was no longer a “safe haven for America’s adversaries, especially narco-traffickers.” In late January, U.S. Charge d’Affaires Laura Dogu arrived in Caracas to prepare for the reopening of an embassy shuttered since relations were formally severed in 2019.
In the weeks that followed, Energy Secretary Chris Wright visited to set an agenda for oil recovery, energy infrastructure and economic cooperation. The head of the Southern Command, General Francis Donovan, met with senior officials of the interim government to discuss security, military cooperation and stability. Interior Secretary Doug Burgum traveled to Caracas to promote a legitimate mining sector and secure critical mineral supply chains.
It could be argued that the first part of U.S. President Donald Trump’s three-phase plan for Venezuela – stabilization, recovery and transition – has been successfully implemented. There were no outbreaks of violence and no displacement crisis. Washington secured access to oil and strategic minerals and took control of security without a military invasion, as in Panama, or a wholesale dismantling of the state, as in Iraq.
The fight against narco-terrorism
U.S. action in Venezuela began before Mr. Maduro’s capture, with Operation Southern Spear. The operation rests on the premise that drug trafficking cannot be tackled through law enforcement alone and must instead be treated as a “hybrid war,” one that, on the administration’s accounting, has killed more Americans than the country’s recent conflicts.
Between September 2025 and June 2026, U.S. forces struck at least 59 vessels alleged to be carrying drugs. On December 18, 2025, an American missile hit an ammunition depot in Zulia state linked to trafficking. The campaign appears to have persuaded many local traffickers not to ship to the U.S.
Meanwhile, Colombian guerrilla commanders have begun returning to their country since Mr. Maduro’s capture, according to AFP reporting, which names leaders of the National Liberation Army (ELN) and the former Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC).
Hundreds of Cuban soldiers, intelligence officers and bodyguards have reportedly been departing from Caracas in recent weeks. This exodus could undermine the surveillance machinery that has long supported Venezuela’s authoritarian regime. The capture of Mr. Maduro also ended Venezuela’s subsidies to Cuba, which served as a crucial lifeline for the island’s economy.
There has been a radical change, because the Venezuelan military is now cooperating with the U.S. military to combat terrorism and drug cartels.
In May, Alex Saab, a Colombian-Venezuelan businessman who for years acted as Mr. Maduro’s financial proxy – handling contracts and sanctions-evasion arrangements on his behalf – was extradited to the U.S. That gives American authorities detailed insight into the corruption and illicit financing networks Mr. Maduro controlled. But in addition, Mr. Saab’s presence could support a second Justice Department criminal case against the former president.
On June 12, President Trump announced that a joint U.S.-Venezuelan strike had killed Hector Rusthenford Guerrero Flores (also known as El Nino Guerrero), a leader of the Venezuelan-origin criminal network Tren de Aragua. The operation took place in the Arco Minero, a mineral-rich region in the south of the country. It came 10 days after the chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Dan Caine, visited Caracas.
In short, there has been a radical change, because the Venezuelan military – many of whom were in the service of the Cartel of the Suns, the drug trafficking cells deeply entrenched in the armed forces – are now cooperating with the U.S. military to combat terrorism and drug cartels.
Toward the second phase: Economic recovery
The second phase of Mr. Trump’s plan focuses on economic recovery. In early June, the U.S. Embassy in Caracas said on X that Venezuelan oil exports had reached 1.25 million barrels per day, the highest level in seven years.
This increase has been possible, in part, because of sanctions relief. The U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued updated versions of seven Venezuela-related general licenses, covering oil exports, U.S. diluent sales, energy services, mining, transactions involving the state oil company Petroleos de Venezuela S.A. (PDVSA) and operations by major international energy companies.
It also owes something to the reform of the Organic Law on Hydrocarbons, passed in January 2026, which allows private companies (domestic and foreign) to take part in primary activities such as exploration, extraction, transport and storage, without the restrictions of the previous model, in which the state and PDVSA were dominant.
There have also been changes at the Central Bank of Venezuela (BCV): The U.S. eased the sanctions imposed on it in 2019. This facilitates the reintegration of the Venezuelan financial system into international markets. The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund have also resumed relations with Venezuela.
Public services remain a bottleneck. The interim government is pushing a reform to allow private investment in the electricity sector, but power outages remain frequent in many regions and periodically bring oil production to a standstill. The U.S. solution is for each company to bring its own generating capacity and operate independently of the national grid, which would ensure that pumping operations continue without disruption.
Some estimates place the cost of restoring the national grid at around $20 billion. Companies such as Siemens and General Electric are considering investing in Venezuela to improve infrastructure, but remain cautious due to legal risks, a history of expropriations and institutional weaknesses.
The earthquake tests the transition
The twin June 24 earthquakes killed more than 5,000 people, injured some 16,000 and destroyed swaths of Caracas and the coastal state of La Guaira. They have changed the political context of the transition. The interim government failed to respond adequately within the first 48 hours, despite established protocols for major catastrophes.
Responsibility may extend beyond the response to the scale of the damage itself. Some of the worst collapses occurred in blocks built under the Chavista-era Gran Mision Vivienda housing program, where poor materials and corruption have long been alleged. Interim President Rodriguez has countered that most of the buildings that fell were privately built.
The disaster has therefore turned into a test of state capacity. It highlights that Venezuela’s recovery cannot be limited to oil production, sanctions relief and security cooperation. Reconstruction will require competent emergency management, credible institutions, safeguards for foreign investment and a broader public services agenda. A comprehensive reconstruction may require that the Rodriguez-led interim regime give way to an emergency administration of competent Venezuelans, without immediate electoral ambitions, that would be in charge of institutional recovery and reconstruction.
Toward the third phase: The transition
Mr. Rubio has pointed to political improvements: Half of the political prisoners have been released, many opposition leaders have returned from exile, media censorship has eased and there is greater tolerance for protest. But the main opposition leader, Maria Corina Machado, still cannot return to the country, and Venezuelans remain afraid to express their opinions freely.
There is also no sign that the interim regime is willing to open positions of power to the opposition. Interim President Rodriguez retains control of all institutions, confining herself to replacing Maduro loyalists with officials aligned with her own faction. For his part, Diosdado Cabello, on whom the U.S. has placed a $25 million bounty, remains the interior minister.
Low wages, inflation and the lack of public services stand out among the problems facing Venezuelans. Total official monthly income is only about $240, most of it made up of non-salary food and “economic war” bonuses rather than the minimum wage itself. The BCV reported cumulative inflation of 71.8 percent in the first quarter of 2026; independent estimates of annual inflation range from 270 percent to more than 600 percent, depending on methodology.
Scenarios
Most likely: Venezuela will complete its transition in 2027
Through the remainder of 2026 and into early 2027, the U.S. intensifies its campaign against drug cartels and irregular armed groups, reducing them to a minimum with support from Colombia’s new president, Abelardo de la Espriella, who takes office on August 7. Oil production continues to rise, stimulating the economy and beginning to benefit the broader population, as the stabilization and recovery phases draw to a close.
Despite resistance from the interim government, the release of political prisoners is completed and independent electoral authorities are appointed. An electoral process begins in mid- to late 2027 – first at the regional and then at the national level – marking the end of the transition phase.
Consequently, democratic institutions are strengthened and a legal framework emerges that restores confidence and provides the safeguards needed to attract major investment, resolving infrastructure problems in electricity, water, healthcare, roads and communications.
This scenario depends increasingly on whether the interim government can manage the earthquake response and the reconstruction that follows. A credible recovery plan backed by the U.S., Europe and Ibero-American governments could accelerate the transition by tying foreign assistance to institutional reform and electoral guarantees.
Less likely: The U.S. elections change Trump’s plan
A Democratic victory in both chambers of Congress in the November 2026 midterm elections forces Mr. Trump to limit the scope of his military and security operations in Venezuela, providing a lifeline to criminal organizations.
Even so, the regime is unlikely to remain in power: The steps already taken have irreversibly set the stage for a transition toward elections (which the Democratic Party would support). Furthermore, due to the region’s shift to the right, the regime has been left without international allies to help it recover lost ground.
Contact us today for tailored geopolitical insights and industry-specific advisory services.
Sign up for our newsletter
Receive insights from our experts every week in your inbox.
