Russia’s Africa footprint is deeper than imagined
Russia has increased its engagement in Africa, focusing on military presence, energy and infrastructure to secure resources and counter Western influence.
In a nutshell
- Russia shifts Africa operations from Wagner group to state-run Africa Corps
- Energy sector focus includes nuclear power and fossil fuel extraction
- Infrastructure proposals emphasize transportation and energy systems
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Russia has steadily expanded its presence across Africa since 2017, establishing operations in several countries through a combination of military contractors, energy partnerships and infrastructure projects. This engagement builds on Soviet-era relationships while pursuing modern strategic goals: securing natural resources, countering Western influence and demonstrating Russia’s relevance as a global power despite international sanctions following its invasion of Ukraine.
The scale of Moscow’s involvement remains smaller than that of China and Western powers. In 2024, Russia’s total trade with Africa was almost $25 billion, significantly lower than China’s $296 billion and the United States’ $104 billion. Nevertheless, Russia has gained outsized influence through targeted interventions in politically unstable regions and key sectors.
The Kremlin’s military footprint in Africa
Russian military involvement in Africa mainly occurs through private military companies. Initially, it was carried out by the now-defunct Wagner group, and subsequently by the Africa Corps, which operates directly under the Russian Ministry of Defense. These groups provide security services, military training and political consulting to African governments in exchange for access to natural resources and strategic facilities.
Facts & figures
Current Russian operations
- Sudan (since 2017): Security services, political consulting
- Central African Republic (since 2018): Presidential protection, military training
- Libya (since 2019): Support for General Haftar’s forces
- Mali (since 2020): Security assistance following military coups
- Mozambique (since 2019): Brief counter-insurgency mission
The list is illustrative and non-exhaustive.
In 2024, the transition from Wagner to the Africa Corps marked a significant shift in Russian military involvement, bringing it under direct state control. This change followed the death of Yevgeny Prigozhin (the head of the Wagner group) and underscored Moscow’s decision to take charge of its African operations rather than to rely on private contractors.
Beyond providing security services, Russia’s most significant military objective is to establish a naval facility in Sudan to gain access to the Red Sea shipping corridor. This base would be Moscow’s first permanent military installation in Africa since the Soviet era. Currently, the long-planned establishment of the naval logistics base in Port Sudan has been put on hold due to the ongoing civil war sweeping the country.
Energy sector presence
Russian energy engagement focuses on nuclear power development and fossil fuel extraction.
Nuclear expansion: Russian state-owned energy company Rosatom has signed cooperation agreements with more than 20 African nations, with binding contracts in place for the construction of nuclear plants in Egypt and ongoing agreements with Nigeria. It expanded its partnerships to include Ethiopia in September and Niger in August of this year. The organization advocates for floating nuclear power units, presenting them as quick-deployment solutions that can be implemented in five years, unlike traditional facilities, which typically take 10-15 years to build.
Oil and gas sector: Russian companies are heavily involved in various activities throughout North and West Africa. Major players such as Gazprom, Lukoil and Rosneft have established a presence in countries including Algeria, Angola, Egypt and Nigeria. A notable example was the contentious decision to select Gazprombank, the third-largest Russian bank, to restart the shut-down Mossel Bay gas-to-liquids plant in South Africa. However, now, a year later, PetroSA terminated its deal with Gazprombank Africa. Russia now also supplies about 80 percent of Morocco’s coal imports.
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Russia’s energy strategy serves dual purposes: generating revenue and creating long-term dependencies. Nuclear agreements often include fuel supply contracts spanning decades, while oil and gas projects offer immediate cash flow and foster strategic partnerships with resource-rich countries.
Infrastructure diplomacy
Russian infrastructure engagement remains limited but strategically focused. Russian Railways (RZD) is involved in railway construction and modernization projects in four African countries, while broader infrastructure cooperation emphasizes transportation and energy systems.
Facts & figures
Key Russian infrastructure projects
- Sudan: Comprehensive agreement covering railway reconstruction and airport development
- Morocco: Proposed involvement in coal hub infrastructure supporting energy imports
- Tanzania: Discussions about participation in port development projects
- Multiple countries: Railway modernization proposals through RZD
Russian officials propose creating integrated financial mechanisms, including a joint Russia-Africa development bank, to facilitate infrastructure funding, as discussed at the Russia-Africa Summit. However, the actual execution of projects has been minimal compared with the substantial investments made under China’s Belt and Road Initiative.
The infrastructure approach highlights equal partnership rhetoric, contrasting Russian engagement with colonial-era relationships. This messaging targets African governments seeking alternatives to Western conditional aid and Chinese debt-heavy financing models.
Scenarios
Most likely: Consolidation and stabilization
Russia maintains current engagement levels while consolidating existing positions. The Africa Corps stabilizes operations in its current countries of deployment, focusing on improving the efficiency of resource extraction and maintaining political relationships. Rosatom completes construction of nuclear plants in Egypt and Nigeria, establishing Russia as a credible provider of nuclear technology.
Military dimension: The Africa Corps consolidates its presence in Sudan, the Central African Republic, Libya and Mali without significant expansion. Personnel levels stabilize around 5,000-6,000 total across all operations. The Sudan naval base becomes operational by 2027. Operations focus on safeguarding existing resource concessions and supporting political ties with current partner governments.
Training programs expand for local forces, fostering deeper collaboration between Russian military advisors and African armed forces. Counter-terrorism operations in Mali continue but with less intensity as the security situation stabilizes. In Libya, operations continue to support Haftar’s forces while avoiding direct confrontation with the Turkish-backed Government of National Accord.
Energy sector development: Rosatom completes construction of nuclear facilities in Egypt (El Dabaa plant) and Nigeria by 2029-2030, showcasing successful project execution. These achievements lead to additional contracts in Rwanda, Ghana and Zambia. Floating nuclear units are deployed in three more countries, offering a total capacity of 600-800 megawatts (MW).
Oil and gas operations expand moderately in existing markets. Gazprom secures additional exploration licenses in Algeria and Angola. Lukoil increases production in existing Nigerian fields. Total Russian energy investment in Africa reaches $8-10 billion by 2030, primarily concentrated in the nuclear and oil sectors.
Infrastructure projects: Railway modernization projects begin in Sudan and another country, likely Ethiopia or Tanzania. Russian Railways completes feasibility studies for three major projects with potential investments of $2-3 billion. The proposed Russia-Africa development bank receives an initial capitalization of $500 million, supporting smaller infrastructure projects.
Port development involvement remains mostly in advisory roles and equipment supply rather than in large construction contracts. Airport modernization projects continue in Sudan and the Central African Republic, supporting both civilian and military aviation needs.
Economic and diplomatic outcomes: Trade volumes increase to around $30 billion by 2030, driven primarily by energy exports and mineral imports. Diplomatic influence stabilizes with Russia maintaining support from 15-20 African countries on key United Nations votes. Visa-free travel agreements expands to include between eight and 10 countries, facilitating business and tourism connections.
The probability of this scenario is 60 percent.
Key risks: Economic sanctions limiting financing capacity, political instability in partner countries and competition from Chinese and Western countries.
Less likely: Aggressive expansion
Russia significantly expands its African operations, taking advantage of improved economic conditions and lower costs due to the Ukraine war. New military deployments focus on West African coastal states and key locations in East Africa. Rosatom speeds up nuclear agreements, aiming for 10 or more new countries. Infrastructure investments grow considerably through better financing mechanisms.
Military dimension: The Africa Corps expands to include between eight and 10 countries with total personnel reaching 12,000-15,000. New deployments target Burkina Faso, Niger, Guinea and potentially Senegal in West Africa. East African expansion includes Somalia, Eritrea and an enhanced presence in Sudan. Naval facilities expand beyond Sudan to include potential bases in Libya and Eritrea.
Military cooperation agreements grow to include more than 35 countries, with Russia becoming the main arms supplier to over 15 African nations. Training programs expand significantly, with Russian military academies opening satellite campuses across Africa. Private military contractor operations broaden beyond the Africa Corps to include specialized units focused on maritime security and resource protection.
Energy sector expansion: Rosatom signs nuclear cooperation agreements with 15 additional countries and has active construction projects in 8-10 locations simultaneously. Total nuclear capacity under Russian management in Africa reaches 8,000-10,000 MW. Floating nuclear units are deployed in more than eight countries, particularly in island nations and coastal states.
Oil and gas operations are expanding dramatically, with Russian companies securing major exploration blocks in Mozambique, Tanzania and Senegal. Gazprom establishes regional headquarters in Nigeria and Algeria. Total Russian energy investment reaches $25-30 billion, making Russia the second-largest energy investor in Africa after China.
Infrastructure development: Railway projects expand to over eight countries with total investment commitments of $15-20 billion. The Russia-Africa Development Bank increases its capitalization to $5 billion and co-finances major infrastructure projects. Port development projects commence in four or five strategic locations, including potential military-civilian dual-use facilities.
Telecommunications infrastructure becomes a new focus area, with Russian companies providing 5G networks and satellite communications systems. Mining infrastructure development accelerates, supporting expanded resource extraction operations.
Economic and diplomatic transformation: Trade volumes reach $60-80 billion by 2035, approaching Chinese levels in certain sectors. Russia invests in economic zones in more than five countries, facilitating manufacturing and assembly operations. Diplomatic influence expands significantly, with Russia gaining support from over 30 African countries on key international issues.
Currency cooperation increases, with several countries accepting rubles for energy transactions. Educational exchanges expand dramatically, with more than 10,000 African students studying at Russian universities annually.
The probability of this scenario is 25 percent.
Key requirements: Successful conclusion of the Ukraine conflict, significant economic recovery, sustained high commodity prices and continued Western focus on other regions.
Least likely: Strategic retreat
Economic pressures from the prolonged Ukraine conflict and international sanctions force Russia to scale back its commitments in Africa. Military operations are reduced to key strategic locations such as Sudan and the Central African Republic. Energy projects continue, but with less funding and slower progress. Infrastructure projects largely cease, except for revenue-generating projects.
Military contraction: The Africa Corps pulls back from Mali, Libya and surrounding areas, focusing forces in Sudan and the Central African Republic. Total personnel drops to 2,000-3,000 and is mainly tasked with protecting key strategic assets and resource extraction sites. The Sudan naval base project encounters major delays, possibly being postponed to 2030 or later.
Military cooperation agreements remain in place, but with reduced practical support. Arms sales decline due to financing constraints and sanctions-related complications. Training programs scale back significantly, with most activities conducted remotely or in Russia rather than in-country.
Energy sector constraints: Nuclear projects in Egypt and Nigeria proceed, but with extended timelines due to financing difficulties. New nuclear agreements decrease significantly, with only two or three additional countries signing cooperation deals. Deployment of floating nuclear units is postponed indefinitely.
Oil and gas operations focus on existing profitable projects while abandoning exploration activities. Gazprom and Lukoil reduce investments in Africa, prioritizing domestic and Asian markets. Total energy-sector investment stagnates at current levels of $3-4 billion.
Infrastructure limitations: Railway projects are suspended except for those with immediate revenue potential. The Russia-Africa Development Bank fails to reach its planned capitalization, limiting its ability to provide financing. Port development participation stops except for equipment supply contracts.
Existing infrastructure commitments face delays and cost overruns. Several announced projects are quietly canceled or indefinitely postponed.
Economic and diplomatic decline: Trade volumes stagnate or decline to $15-18 billion due to sanctions complications and reduced investment capacity. Diplomatic influence decreases as Russia cannot fulfill its previous commitments. Several African countries diversify their partnerships to reduce their dependence on Russian support.
Visa-free travel agreements provide limited benefits due to reduced business activity and travel restrictions. Educational exchanges decline as scholarship funding decreases.
Regional implications: Security gaps emerge in Mali and Libya as Russian forces withdraw, potentially increasing instability. Chinese and Western actors fill some gaps left by the reduced Russian presence. African partners seek alternative security and development partners.
Resource extraction operations continue, but at reduced efficiency due to limited security and infrastructure support. Some mining concessions may be renegotiated or transferred to other operators.
The probability of this scenario is 15 percent.
Triggering factors: Severe economic crisis in Russia, major military setbacks in Ukraine, significantly enhanced Western sanctions and domestic political instability in Russia.
Recovery potential: This scenario includes the possibility of future reengagement if Russian economic conditions improve and international constraints ease. Core relationships in Sudan and the Central African Republic could serve as foundations for renewed expansion after 2030.
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