Estonia mulls preemptive strikes against Russia
Tallinn has adopted a posture of bold deterrence, vowing preemptive strikes against Russia to protect sovereignty and NATO credibility.
In a nutshell
- Estonia has abandoned passive defense, embracing preemptive readiness
- New NATO members Finland and Sweden bolster Baltic deterrence
- Historical trauma and strategic vulnerability fuel Estonia’s resolve
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Amid increasingly belligerent Russian rhetoric against NATO, tiny Estonia has assumed the role of David standing up to Goliath. In recent months, Tallinn has intensified its signaling that in the case of an imminent Russian invasion, it would not hesitate to strike first. The world is now seeing the country’s logic.
In a September 2024 interview with the Estonian public broadcaster ERR, Estonian General Vahur Karus stated that if Moscow showed signs of preparing for an attack, Estonia would strike the Russians first: “Our capability to neutralize the enemy on its own territory is crucial.” In the subsequent months, Estonia has continued on this path. In late July the country’s defense ministry issued its defense strategy, which aims to “counter threats before they reach Estonian territory.”
Before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the official doctrine was to hold off Russian invaders for 10 days, waiting for NATO reinforcements to arrive. In the words of General Karus, waiting to be attacked first is no longer an option. Just a few years ago, Estonians readying to hit the Russian military on Russian territory would have been considered outlandish. Today, there are abundant reasons why it must be taken seriously.
Once exposed, now in lockstep with neighboring allies
First, it is no coincidence that it is Estonia making this move. Although Estonia and Lithuania have been taking a hard stance against both Russia and Western prevarication over assistance to Ukraine, Estonia’s strategic position is considerably more exposed than that of Lithuania. In wargaming exercises of a possible Russian attack against NATO, Estonia has been a prime target. The conclusion has been that the country could be overrun in 48 hours.
The fate of Estonia is intimately linked to the credibility of NATO itself. If the alliance cannot present a convincing case that Estonia will be defended against a Russian attack, then its Article 5 on collective defense no longer stands. Achieving precisely this outcome has been a primary objective of Russian foreign and security policy.
The fate of Estonia is intimately linked to the credibility of NATO itself.
While Finland and Sweden remained neutral, making the case for a credible defense of Estonia was a tall order indeed. Coming to the rescue by sea would mean having to run the gauntlet past the heavily fortified Kaliningrad bastion, whose powerful anti-ship missiles would take a serious toll on any passing convoys. An overland rescue mission from Poland via Lithuania would also be risky, as it would have to cross the Suwalki Gap, a 70 kilometer-wide corridor between Belarus and Kaliningrad where an artillery barrage could cause heavy casualties.
Seeing its own credibility at stake, NATO had to come up with a remedy. Fearful of provoking Russia by building bases in the Baltic states, or by stationing serious land forces there, the compromise solution was to introduce token contingents that came to be known as “tripwire” forces. The logic was that if Russia did invade, it would have to kill NATO troops. As the alliance governments would then be forced to respond in kind, NATO would be drawn into war with Russia. It was hoped that this would be sufficient to deter Russia.
The task of sending a tripwire force to Estonia fell to the United Kingdom, whose rotating troops have since been given a warm welcome. As none of the three Baltic states have their own air forces, NATO also assumed the responsibility of protecting their air spaces via “air policing.” Operating out of local air bases, NATO countries have taken turns contributing jet fighters that must be routinely scrambled to ward off Russian incursions. While all of this may have looked good on paper and in meetings, in practice, it was a rather shaky setup.
But following the accession of Sweden and Finland to NATO, the strategic landscape in the Baltic region has been fundamentally transformed. Instead of NATO contemplating the dangers of passing through Kaliningrad or the Suwalki Gap, Russia must now consider that any attempt to venture forth into the Baltic via the Gulf of Finland would be met with overwhelming force. It would be opposed not only by powerful anti-ship missile batteries on the shores of Finland and Estonia but also by the ultra-silent state-of-the-art Swedish submarine fleet. Additionally, an actual Russian attack against Estonia would be met by an overwhelming NATO response, ranging from artillery barrages against invading troops to missile strikes against rear echelons and a swift achievement of air superiority deep into Russia itself, allowing interdiction of supply lines and staging areas.
Painful experience begets action
While all of this should reassure Estonia that in the event of a Russian invasion, it would be quickly liberated, reality is very different from theory. What remains deeply concerning for Estonians, who are on the receiving end of increasingly outrageous Russian threats, is that there is a big difference between preventing invasion and being liberated after the fact. The tragedy of Ukraine, the kidnapped children and the fate of those in cities like Bucha clearly show what happens to the local people in territories that are overrun by Russian forces.
The key to understanding Estonia’s predicament rests in the lack of “strategic depth.” Russia itself has always relied on countering invading forces by falling back and burning everything left behind. Although the human cost of this “scorched earth” defense has been huge, history has shown that it works. Despite massive initial successes, both Napoleon and Hitler would eventually be defeated and forced into retreat.
For Estonia, this is not an option. Due to its small geographic scale, the country lacks strategic depth and is focused on protecting its population. Memories of the Russian invasion in 1940 are still very much alive. All Estonians have tales to tell of what happened to relatives who were subjected to Russian mass deportations, in most cases, to death in Siberia. Many also remember how the neighbors to the north managed to save their country from Russian occupation, and as a result, enjoyed the benefits of decades of liberal democracy and material welfare.
When Russia attacked Finland in November 1939, the Finnish defenders set up a defensive line on the Karelian Isthmus and along the Svir River, which connects Lake Onega with Lake Ladoga. Although the Russian forces had overwhelming numerical superiority, they did not even come close to the Finnish proficiency in winter warfare. Nor could they overcome the Finnish determination to defend their country at any cost. The Karelian Isthmus came to be known as the “lock of Finland,” and it held.
When Russia attacked Estonia, its defense forces did put up a valiant fight, but they did not have the natural defensive positions that were so helpful to the Finns. What the Estonians did achieve was a slowdown in the progress of the invasion that allowed a substantial part of the population to escape across the sea to neutral Sweden. Embracing their adopted home, the Estonians went on to become by far the most successful ethnic group in Sweden, outperforming the Swedes on a range of indicators. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the restoration of Estonian independence, many of these refugees returned to their homeland and brought with them skills and networks that were of great help in the integration of Estonia into the European community.
The current willingness of Estonians to fight for their country’s independence is among the highest in the world.
Given this background, it is understandable that the current willingness of Estonians to fight for their country’s independence is among the highest in the world. The readiness to do military service is very high, as is the readiness to join territorial defense units and other forms of support for national sovereignty. Their sentiment is that what happened in 1940 after the Russian occupation must never be allowed to happen again.
In the words of former Estonian President Toomas Ilves, if the Russians come, “We will fight like hell.” Born in Sweden in 1953, Mr. Ilves was a prominent member of the Estonian diaspora that returned to serve their old country after independence was restored. Having served as president from 2006 to 2016, he has since been a highly influential voice, shaping international opinion and galvanizing the national resolve in standing up to Russia.
Today’s needs when neighboring Russia
The Estonian determination to preserve its sovereignty is reflected in a strong commitment to defense and border security. It has invested heavily in boosting military installations along the border, and it is joining with Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Finland in a controversial decision (for some) to leave the Ottawa Treaty that bans the use of anti-personnel mines. These countries all feel a need to deter land invasion by mining their borders with Russia.
Estonia is also marked by a strong political consensus on the need to allocate a growing share of gross domestic product (GDP) to national defense. In the run-up to the recent NATO summit in The Hague, the Estonian parliament approved a four-year 2.8 billion-euro additional defense funding bill that will raise its defense spending from 3.4 percent of GDP to an average of 5.4 percent of GDP through 2029. Noting that the country had never before allocated so much money to national security, Minister of Defense Hanno Pevkur envisioned that the new level would remain “for quite a long time.”
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The allocated funding will be spent on a range of objectives, from equipment and ammunition to medium-range air defense, additional engineering troops, long-range reconnaissance battalions, modern communications systems and increased naval capabilities. Funding for long-range strike capabilities is particularly important. This will make the threat of preemptive strikes to ward off an imminent invasion more credible.
Although military support from NATO countries has been essential to Ukraine’s survival, that support has been riddled with caveats that have seriously impaired its ability to strike back. Over and above restrictions on the use of NATO weapons to strike targets inside Russia, the effectiveness of the military aid has been undermined by a dogged insistence on providing Russia with strategic clarity. While there may be understandable political reasons why European governments have been so keen on publicly disclosing all military aid to Ukraine, this transparency has immensely helped Russian planners to know exactly what Ukrainian defenders will receive and when.
The new Estonian policy marks a complete reversal. The threat of preemptive strikes and the abandonment of strategic clarity deprives Russian military planners of the luxury of preparing for an invasion without fear of being attacked on their own territory. This ensures there will be no repeat of the months of unopposed preparation for the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
The remaining question is how this will affect Russian strategic planning.
Scenarios
Possible: Russia, unconvinced by NATO posture, strikes Estonia
In one scenario, Russia proceeds undeterred, relying on overwhelming force to carry the day even if attacked while gearing up for the assault. Once the attack has been launched, it will be up to NATO to decide whether to enter a full military confrontation with Russia to save tiny Estonia. Statements from United States President Donald Trump suggest a negative answer, and prevarication by many European governments could reinforce the Putin regime’s belief that NATO’s Article 5 no longer holds.
Possible: Coalition within NATO holds firm and deters Russia
An alternative scenario is that with Estonia in the lead, countries in the “Nordic-Baltic Eight,” supported by Poland and the UK, may create enough concern on the Russian side about a forceful preemptive strike that it serves to deter an actual invasion. Given that the likelihood of other countries making similar threats is very low, Estonia will be on its own in facing mounting ire from the Kremlin. The viability of this scenario depends on what messages are being sent behind the scenes. If the “coalition of the willing” does maintain a common posture of not yielding to Russian pressure, then it may work.
Most likely: Russia continues provocations but is kept in check
While the most likely scenario for the coming years remains that Russia will keep pushing, will keep escalating various hybrid operations and will keep stepping on red lines without crossing them, it cannot be excluded that an attack will follow, even while the war against Ukraine is being prosecuted. The Estonian play will at the very least be sure to have a cooling effect, postponing if not precluding a Russian attack.
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