Scenarios

Most likely: Prolonged contestation and uneasy status quo

The most likely scenario is one of continued contestation. Under this scenario, while the upcoming elections could lead to some disturbances in the limited constituencies where they take place, resistance forces would continue to control key regions in Myanmar. The Tatmadaw would hold onto significant levers of power, regardless of any changes in personnel, including for junta chief Min Aung Hlaing.

While elections might marginally boost the junta’s local legitimacy in the areas it controls, they could also ease some of the regional pressure from neighboring Southeast Asian states – some of which may send observers to the elections themselves, despite internal divisions within ASEAN. However, global criticism from organizations such as the UN and the European Union will continue. Speaking at a special summit between ASEAN and the UN held in Malaysia recently, UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres warned that under the current circumstances, elections “risk further exclusion and instability.”

The ongoing contestation could coexist alongside different interpretations of national unity put forth by various groups. Beyond narrow agreements made within the junta to adjust the perceived balance of civil-military dynamics or with resistance factions, conversations have persisted around more inclusive and ambitious visions, such as establishing a federal democratic union.

Less likely: Power shift toward the junta or resistance forces

In a less likely scenario, the balance of power would gradually shift toward either the junta or the resistance forces. Even members of the opposition now admit they face an increasingly uphill struggle against the junta despite their best efforts.

For instance, a recent estimate from the opposition National Unity Government (NUG), which operates as a parallel government in exile, highlighted that the junta had made military inroads through counteroffensives. It has capitalized on the shifting postures of armed groups, which are under pressure from a “powerful neighboring country” – a clear reference to China. According to the NUG’s own figures, which have been disputed by the military government, the junta currently controls 39 percent of the country’s territory, and only 16 percent is held by opposing forces, with the remainder either under siege or embroiled in active fighting.

Despite its own limitations in terms of rations and weapons, the NUG also noted that the election could serve as a further unifying factor for revolutionary forces. This unity might enable them to adapt their asymmetric warfare tactics, thereby improving resource management and operational effectiveness. As a result, they could achieve some gains in seizing strategic areas from the junta, potentially turning the tide of the conflict.

In a more extreme version of this scenario, the junta could gain ground and shift the balance of power in its favor. Some members of the opposition are concerned that this might trigger foreign involvement, not just by regional countries like India and Thailand, but also the U.S.

Least likely: Disintegration triggers a “Great Scramble” among neighbors

The least likely scenario is one of growing disintegration. The implications of this would be profound. Historically, past periods of heightened fragmentation in Myanmar have typically led to a surge in drug and arms trafficking across its borders. During such times, individual ethnic armed groups shift their focus toward solidifying their control and strengthening their positions.

If this scenario unfolds, it would create a dual reality where ethnic armed groups control parts of the country, while the junta maintains its authority over some areas and urban centers like Yangon. In this situation, we would likely see major actors, including Myanmar’s neighbors, rushing to safeguard their own interests. Their actions may center on pursuing their agendas, which, while beneficial to them, might not help prevent the country’s disintegration. One regional official aptly described this shift as moving from the “Great Game” to the “Great Scramble.”

China is likely to accelerate its ongoing efforts to secure deals with various stakeholders to protect key infrastructure projects. India could, in turn, seek informal arrangements to mitigate the spillover effects of violence into its northeastern states. While some might conclude that this major power maneuvering could reinforce voices within Washington advocating non-intervention in Myanmar, some officials have privately suggested that it might actually strengthen calls for greater U.S. engagement during a sudden crisis. It could resemble the evolving American response to the Thailand-Cambodia border war.

Even the Tatmadaw has been careful to manage expectations about the election, sharing details only periodically, such as the timeline for individual phases and the specific townships involved. This cautious approach only reinforces the reality that, whatever short-term legitimacy the junta hopes to gain from the elections, they are not likely to stabilize Myanmar’s future.