Will Trump’s plan to split Russia and China succeed?
As the U.S. struggles to divide its rivals, its missteps contrast with China’s deft diplomacy and Russia’s strategic craftiness.
In a nutshell
- Trump’s policies reflect a flawed attempt at balancing global powers
- China’s dexterity shifts the international power dynamic in its favor
- Russia leverages U.S. miscalculations to strengthen alliances
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Donald Trump’s return to the White House has sparked a major global shift, with three leaders confidently staking out their spheres of influence, evoking modern imperial ambitions. The intricacies of global politics underscore that this power divide is anything but simple. The traditional concept of “the West” has largely dissolved, at least in the political sense.
This shift appears to be paving the way for improved United States-Russia relations, or at least creating conditions for such a thaw. However, it also suggests that Washington is willingly stepping back from its role as the world’s unchallenged superpower. The Trump administration seems to acknowledge, or even accommodate, the interests of countries like Russia and China. Yet, bound by the Republican Party’s longstanding traditions, President Trump has, for the time being, continued to use strong anti-communist rhetoric. It is within this context that the controversial “reverse Nixon” strategy has emerged.
Trump’s ‘reverse Nixon’ strategy
The Nixon Strategy refers to President Richard Nixon’s 1972 visit to China during the Cold War, a move that warmed U.S.-China ties and helped isolate the Soviet Union. Conversely, today’s pundits of international relations describe the Trump administration’s approach as the so-called reverse Nixon strategy, aiming to draw Russia closer as a counterbalance to China.
However, this concept does not align with historical realities. When President Nixon discreetly sent National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger to Beijing, the conflict between China and Russia had already reached a point of no return. At that time, the U.S. government simply capitalized on the evolving situation. This scenario contrasts sharply with the current state of Sino-Russian relations. First, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping share an unprecedented personal bond, having met over 40 times since 2013. Second, the war in Ukraine has intertwined Russia and China’s interests more tightly than ever before.
In an interview with Breitbart News, President Trump asserted that if improving U.S.-Russia relations could lead Moscow to “disengage from China,” it would be “a good thing.” Following his discussions with President Putin, Mr. Trump told Fox News, “As a student of history, I’ve looked at all of history – the first thing you learn is that you don’t want Russia and China to go together.” However, his perspective on geopolitics seems muddled, or at the very least, inconsistent.
Elbridge Colby, the U.S. undersecretary of defense for policy, suggested that the White House’s focus should primarily be on the Indo-Pacific region. During a Senate hearing on March 4, he referred to China as “the biggest and strongest adversary that the United States has had in probably 150 years.”
The Trump administration’s reverse Nixon strategy aims to divide China and Russia, yet it seems to overlook the robust economic partnership and mutual benefits binding Beijing and Moscow.
Beijing goes from worried to confident
Upon taking office in January, Mr. Trump adopted a notably conciliatory approach toward President Putin, often engaging with him in a highly amicable manner. In return, the Russian leader frequently expressed positive sentiments about his American counterpart, suggesting a potential for rapid improvement in relations between Moscow and Washington. This dynamic has unfolded alongside U.S. efforts to mediate peace in the ongoing Ukraine conflict. The shift in U.S.-Russia engagement has caused great consternation among China’s political elite.
However, Russia has responded with dissatisfaction to the White House’s design for peace in Ukraine, appearing reluctant to fully align with this vision. President Putin’s strategic goals likely extend beyond what Mr. Trump anticipates. The Russian leader perceives Mr. Trump as manipulable, overly trusting and influenced by his confident businessman mindset. President Trump’s skeptical and at times dismissive stance toward NATO and Ukraine aligns with the Kremlin’s interests. To mitigate the economic strain of the ongoing war, Russia seeks support from countries like the U.S., particularly in easing sanctions.
President Putin intends to leverage improved U.S. relations to exert pressure on Beijing. China has capitalized on Russia’s economic challenges stemming from the war, pressing it to reduce natural gas prices and buy Chinese cars and goods. Strengthening ties with the U.S. would advance Russia’s interests.
The Trump administration’s reverse Nixon strategy aims to divide China and Russia, yet it seems to overlook the robust economic partnership and mutual benefits binding Beijing and Moscow.
Since 2025, Beijing has cautiously signaled to Moscow that there should be limits to a U.S.-Russian detente, warning that exceeding them could strain Sino-Russian relations. On April 1, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi met with President Putin in Moscow, where he stated that constructive Russia-U.S. engagement could foster positive expectations amid global challenges, while describing the reverse Nixon strategy as impractical. He said, “China-Russia relations will not stand still, but will only become broader and broader. Our friendship is not oriented towards the present, but looks to the longer-term future.” He added that the two countries are “friends forever, never enemies.” Earlier in February 2022, President Xi reaffirmed the “no limits” partnership with Russia.
In Beijing’s favor, Mr. Putin remains ambivalent to Mr. Trump’s overtures. This is for two main reasons. First, Mr. Trump’s unpredictable nature and the significant opposition within the U.S. elite, including some in the Republican Party, to his approach toward Russia. Second, the likelihood of President Trump staying in power is limited to just four years, whereas the Russian and Chinese leaders’ relationship is likely to endure well beyond that timeframe.
As for the U.S., President Trump’s attempts to broker peace in the Ukraine war have hit a wall. Despite the White House’s efforts to acquiesce to President Putin’s demands, agreeing before negotiations even started to recognize Crimea as Russian territory – against Ukraine and Europe’s wishes – Mr. Putin’s ambitions surpass what Mr. Trump can offer. This makes the U.S.’s proposed peace initiatives, such as a 30-day ceasefire, impossible to implement. As a result, Moscow is even more convinced that it cannot distance itself from China.
The Russia-China alliance strengthens
Moscow’s Victory Day military parade on May 9, marking the 80th anniversary of World War II’s end, subtly showcased China and Russia’s diplomatic efforts to counter President Trump’s influence. This Victory Day celebration highlighted the growing strength of authoritarian state power. Unlike last year’s parade, which drew only seven heads of state and none in 2022 when Russia began its invasion of Ukraine, this time 27 leaders attended, even including a prime minister from a European Union state. Central to this event was China; President Putin honored President Xi as his most distinguished guest. During the event, the two nations signed agreements, deepening cooperation in areas like military, aviation and nuclear power.
Moreover, economic and trade cooperation between China and Russia has surged over the past decade, driven by tensions with the West and a multidimensional rapprochement. Bilateral trade has hit new records each year since Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. China has become Russia’s leading trading partner, especially for energy exports and advanced technology imports, leaving Moscow with few alternatives amid growing economic isolation.
President Xi’s visit to Moscow aimed to strengthen ties with his Russian counterpart and demonstrate that Mr. Trump’s efforts to align Russia against China had not succeeded. The trip coincided with Beijing and Washington’s tariff negotiations in Switzerland. During the visit, President Xi included some critical or even biting remarks about the U.S. in the joint Russia-China statement, reflecting his resentment. Had the Chinese leader known that President Trump would later accommodate some of China’s demands, the statement’s tone toward the U.S. might have been less pointed.
Nevertheless, Mr. Putin’s strategic calculations differ from those of President Xi. He aims to achieve a so-called victory in the Ukraine war while simultaneously seeking to restore relations with the U.S. His goals include persuading the White House to rescind sanctions against Russia and attracting American investment to bolster its economy.
President Putin’s mindset aligns closely with President Trump’s in some ways. Based on his actions, Mr. Trump appears frustrated with peace efforts that fail to yield quick results and has often threatened to withdraw from his role as a mediator. Although internal and external pressures urge Mr. Trump to push for tougher sanctions against Moscow’s maximalist demands, he refuses to commit and continues to avoid the issue. Throughout the year, he has briefly mentioned possibly tightening sanctions on Russia, but has taken no action.
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The U.S. administration’s approach to China in the first round of the tariff war has been less confrontational than in previous years. Although President Trump imposed levies starting at 145 percent, projecting a significant threat, negotiations quickly revealed a more accommodating stance. President Xi’s tough stance proved effective, with Beijing securing nearly all its initial core demands in the U.S.-China trade talks. The U.S. applied little to no pressure on Beijing to reform its non-market economic policies, with outcomes limited to minor technical adjustments.
The 145 percent tariffs imposed on most Chinese goods were temporarily reduced to 30 percent for a period of 90 days, while Chinese duties on many U.S. goods were lowered to 10 percent. And while negotiations temporarily stalled, with each side accusing the other of backtracking, cool heads have prevailed. Beijing sees this as a win in the initial round of the trade war, interpreting it as a sign that the U.S. is backing down.
This shift highlights a key realization: Americans have come to understand that the U.S. relies on China just as much as China relies on the U.S. In fact, the economic ties between the U.S. and China are nearly as strong as those between the U.S. and Europe. Furthermore, China holds certain advantages, such as its technology and capacity for processing rare earths. Alarmingly, about 80 percent of U.S. military weapons and equipment cannot be produced without these processed rare earths, most of which currently come from China.
Scenarios
Two scenarios are likely, one more so than the other. Despite President Trump’s reverse Nixon strategy, the Russian-Chinese alliance will endure in either scenario.
Most likely: Sino-Russian ties deepen, frustrating Trump
The war in Ukraine will likely continue as Europe supports Ukraine to slow Russia’s advances and isolate its economy. The determination of the Ukrainian people to resist will continue to pose significant challenges for Russia. Yet the Americans will not provide weapons for a decisive victory for Kyiv. This means that Russia’s war on Ukraine will wearily continue. President Trump, with no ceasefire achieved − let alone a peace deal − will most probably completely step back from the role of mediator.
Although U.S.-Russian relations will be superficially cordial during the Trump administration, President Putin will continue to align with Beijing as the Russian economy is dependent on Chinese largesse and political cover in BRICS. Mr. Trump will struggle to foster deeper cooperation between the U.S. and Russia, which will limit the White House’s ability to maintain good relations with Europe. It is predictable that rescinding sanctions across the board is not in the cards.
Regarding Beijing, the situation in Washington will remain as challenging as ever. China’s hold on critical minerals remains the ace up its sleeve in trade negotiations with the U.S. and beyond, while China, with its manufacturing overcapacity, will keep leaning on the Russian market as a destination for exports. The swift development of China’s military technology and naval expansion in the Western Pacific will outpace that of the U.S. As a result, Washington will find itself in a reactive position and will not have broken the Russo-Sino alliance.
Less likely: Russia tires, Trump eases sanctions but Russo-Sino alliance endures
The next year and a half, leading up to the 2026 midterm elections, are crucial for the current U.S. administration. With President Putin’s ambitions for territorial expansion – aiming to control at least the Ukrainian territory east of the Dnieper River – the earliest that Russia could realistically achieve its annexation goals may be by the end of this year – according to a Chinese military expert’s assessments. However, despite reinforcements from North Korea bolstering the Russian invading force, military support from Europe to Ukraine will persist, possibly prolonging the current stalemate.
In this scenario, Russian appetite to wage a costly war might weaken, particularly as the domestic economy continues to deteriorate. This could push Russian leadership to prioritize a ceasefire and seek a temporary end to the conflict in Ukraine. The Trump administration in this case will look to mend ties with Moscow, claim some sort of victory and there is a possibility that some sanctions against Russia could eventually be lifted.
However, the road to negotiations will not be easy: Russia will still need China as a market for fossil fuels to prop up the state budget, China will continue exporting cars and machinery to Russia and American capital is unlikely to flow into Russia as President Putin would prefer.
But Presidents Trump and Xi will engage in talks and the two sides are likely to resolve the tariff disputes, reach a tacit agreement regarding Taiwan that allows Beijing to avoid major military action or blockades of the island during the Trump presidency. Despite this, the current administration in Washington will not be able to counteract Beijing’s growth as a regional and global powerhouse and Presidents Xi and Putin will remain partners.
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