The Romanian election reboot
Nicusor Dan’s election marks the end of a protracted political crisis, but raises questions about Romania’s geopolitical alignment.
In a nutshell
- Nicusor Dan won an unexpected rerun after Russian interference claims
- Geopolitical narratives dominated the campaign
- The new president will need to calibrate Romania’s strategic alignment
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The Romanian presidential election saga is over. Bucharest Mayor Nicusor Dan won on May 18, defeating George Simion in a closely watched runoff. Mr. Dan secured 53.8 percent of the vote against Mr. Simion’s 46.2 percent, with a record 65 percent turnout – the highest in 25 years.
Despite Mr. Simion’s 20 percent lead in the first round on May 4, Mr. Dan managed to catch up with his opponent and win the presidency in the second round. This comeback, initially considered improbable by observers, was called “a miracle of democracy” by the media. Meanwhile, many others expressed skepticism – for example businessman and former United States presidential advisor Elon Musk.
The elections were rerun after the 2024 vote was invalidated due to alleged Russian interference. In the initial election’s first round, held in November, independent candidate Calin Georgescu unexpectedly led the presidential race with 22.94 percent of the vote. On December 6, the Constitutional Court annulled the election, citing declassified but inconclusive intelligence.
The ruling sparked outrage, with Mr. Georgescu and his rival Elena Lasconi denouncing it as a “coup” against democracy. Former President Klaus Iohannis defended the decision as a national security necessity and extended his mandate indefinitely under a contentious interpretation of the constitution. He was eventually forced to resign following public outcry over his involvement in the election’s cancellation.
The ensuing electoral rerun was a tense, confused and unpredictable process. During the second election, Romania lost its status of functional democracy and was downgraded to the level of a “hybrid regime,” its already structurally weakened economy deteriorated further, and the United States withdrew the country from the Visa Waiver Program. Although the U.S. Department of Homeland Security did not initially explicitly connect the decision to concerns about democratic backsliding, Vice President JD Vance’s criticism of the annulled election led some to see it immediately that way.
By all formal accounts, the second attempt to produce a fairly acceptable election process was designed to showcase the strength of Romania’s democratic institutions and its commitment to Western values despite being now considered a “hybrid regime.” On paper, it was a success. Mr. Simion conceded, pledging to continue his “sovereignist” fight, while Mr. Dan’s supporters gathered in Bucharest, calling for a “new stage” in the country’s history. Whether this marks a true new beginning or merely the continuation of the old regime in a new form is now the central question.
Romania’s two-tiered governance system
The 2024-2025 Romanian elections offer a revealing case study in “managed democracy.” To understand these electoral developments, it is essential to understand the country’s two-tiered governance structure. This arrangement separates the political state, comprising standard democratic and liberal institutions, from the underlying governance apparatus, a network of actors and institutions that wield power beyond the visible political layer.
In Romania, this informal layer has functioned effectively over the past two decades or so. It includes technocratic elites, intelligence and defense services, strategic economic actors and local political networks. Despite moments of turbulence, this structure has delivered stability and resilience. It marginalized disruptive oligarchs, upheld broadly European-aligned politics, and enabled decent economic and political performance – even if it did not always live up to democratic standards.
Over the past decade, this two-tiered governance system has often been referred to informally as the “Iohannis regime.” Former President Iohannis emerged as the central figurehead of the surface tier, acting as a key intermediary between formal democratic institutions and the invisible governance architecture composed of technocratic, security and administrative elites.
This regime showed remarkable adaptability during periods of acute crisis, including the Covid-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine. It engineered an unlikely and ideologically incoherent governing coalition between the Social Democratic Party (PSD) and the National Liberal Party (PNL). The resulting grand coalition worked reasonably well given the circumstances, but it consolidated power by effectively dissolving the traditional left-right distinctions.
The Iohannis regime secured short-term stability at a price. Democratic competition weakened, transparency in policymaking declined, and those in power became more shielded from public pressure. Across government and politics, key roles increasingly went to loyalists rather than the most qualified people.
Whether due to democratic fatigue with an entrenched regime or frustration over corruption and poor performance, public dissatisfaction grew. This discontent had to be managed by the political layer, leading to the rapid emergence of several “anti-system” parties and movements aiming to capture and channel the public’s anger.
This was the context in which the electoral drama played out. What began as a referendum on the Iohannis regime – its legacy, and the broader political and governance system behind it – was soon reframed as a stark showdown between pro-European, pro-Western forces and anti-European, pro-Russian sentiment. This divide was largely artificial, masking the deeper cultural and governance issues that shaped voter concerns. Still, it allowed the system an effective way to defend its eroding legitimacy.
Public opinion versus political narrative
The narrative of existential geopolitical dilemma was amplified by political elites, mainstream media and external actors, particularly in the context of Romania’s strategic position on NATO’s eastern flank and the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian War. Candidates like Elena Lasconi, as well as the Iohannis regime’s ruling coalition, were described as defenders of the European Union and NATO. Candidates like Calin Georgescu and George Simion were labeled as anti-European or pro-Russian.
Opinion polls from 2024 and 2025 consistently show strong Romanian support for Western institutions, undermining the idea of a significant cleavage between pro-West and anti-West factions. In November 2024, a poll found that 81 percent of Romanians would vote to stay in NATO, with only 8 percent favoring withdrawal. Some 90 percent support EU membership. According to a 2025 INSCOP study, more than 80 percent of Romanians would not vote for a “nationalist party if it would promote a rapprochement toward Russia.”
The notion of a 50-50 split between pro-Russian and pro-European voters in Romanian society was therefore never supported by data. Despite this, mass media aggressively pushed this narrative, often downplaying domestic governance failures and mischaracterizing sensitive cultural issues as geopolitical matters.
Polls consistently show that Romanian voters prioritize cultural and collective identity issues, as well as governance, the economy and principally, the fight against corruption. Almost 73 percent point to corruption as the most pressing problem; 30 percent are dissatisfied with the state of education; and 23 percent are worried about the economy, inflation and the state of the business environment.
Regardless, portraying the elections as an existential struggle tied to a major geopolitical divide proved an undeniable success. All parties enthusiastically embraced their roles in this narrative. This dramatic electoral reboot resonated deeply with the public, leading to record-high voter participation.
Memorable moments unfolded along the way: dramatic arrests, spy rings and clandestine networks dismantled, and extremists exposed. A 101-year-old general was unmasked as the ringleader of a group of retired officers, chess instructors and building administrators preparing a Russian-backed coup. Emotional letters and public declarations of concern from intellectuals and cultural elites circulated widely. Employers and corporation managers delivered dramatic last-minute speeches instructing their employees on how to vote. The otherwise very heterogeneous and quarrelsome political factions of the Iohannis regime converged under one banner.
And thus, one thing led to another, and the entire process increasingly took on a new and startling geopolitical dimension in its final stages. Surprisingly, it was not based on the highly vaunted pro-Western vs. pro-Russian tension. Instead, the discourse looked more and more like a contest for control between MAGA/Trump-inspired insurgent movements and the EU establishment, which embodied a sclerotic status quo. This effectively pitted the U.S. against France.
This is arguably the most significant and consequential outcome of this election. The result – at least superficially – suggests a shift in allegiance within Romania’s two-tiered governance system, moving from the U.S. toward France. This repositioning of the underlying governance structure was not without significant resistance from a segment of Romanian society. The extent of this resistance will only become apparent once the media campaigns subside and the contours of the emerging post-electoral realities become clearer.
More by Paul Dragos Aligica
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The costs are, however, already visible and not at all negligible. Romanian diplomacy and foreign policy, long known for its dexterity, proved surprisingly inept in this instance. The relationship with the U.S., and especially with the Trump administration, was badly handled from the very beginning. In addition to mismanaging relations with the Trump campaign, Romania continued, long after the November U.S. elections, to operate by the old playbook of the Biden administration and the U.S. State Department.
To make things worse, as part of the electoral campaign, one of the most aggressive anti-American campaigns in Romanian history was mounted. Media, NGO representatives and political commentators indulged in a frenzy of Trump-bashing and anti-Republican rhetoric paired with aggressive pro-European agitation.
The election’s final result means that the new president of Romania must now navigate relations with Washington while being perceived as a Macron protege, surrounded by advisors and networks that participated in a virulent anti-American and anti-Trump campaign. It is a tall order, especially at a time when the U.S. is reconsidering its role in Europe.
Romanian society is now deeply fractured. The presidential campaign set urban liberals against “anti-Western” rural masses. Now, President Dan faces the task of healing Romania while being perceived as the leader of the forces that vilified almost 50 percent of the population.
His task will be complicated even further by the deep crisis in the economy and public administration system. Radical and painful measures are unavoidable. How the Romanian public will perceive the potential reform measures and policies could unfold according to two different scenarios.
Scenarios
Likely: The Dan administration is perceived as a continuation of the old regime
Under the first scenario, President Dan is seen as a mere refurbishment of the Iohannis regime. In this case, the legitimacy of his policies and reforms will be questioned.
This scenario points to turbulent times ahead. The opposition – likely to be backed by the Trump administration, either as a check on the current regime or as a platform for political reconquest – is poised to become the dominant force in the public imagination over the next few years.
The crisis within the Romanian system will endure, manifesting in new and unpredictable ways, as the country grapples with its self-inflicted rift: an alignment with the EU and France versus its ties to the U.S.
Unlikely: The Dan administration successfully reforms Romania
Under this scenario, the way forward could take two forms. A minimalist path would give the existing two-tiered system a facelift: new people, new codes of conduct and a refreshed public image, without altering its underlying structure. A maximalist path would involve dismantling the managed democracy model and moving toward a system grounded in citizen sovereignty and representative democracy.
Pursuing the latter would provoke strong resistance from entrenched interests within the two-tiered framework, particularly elements of the security services, bureaucratic elites and the economic and influence networks shaped during the Iohannis era. To overcome this, Mr. Dan would need to build new political coalitions and potentially seek support from external democratic actors to lend legitimacy and momentum. His success would depend on his ability to both neutralize the old guard and mobilize a reformist public.
A bold populist strategy might be his best bet: rallying a broad civic coalition under the banner of democratic renewal. By channeling discontent with the former regime and reclaiming sovereignty narratives, Mr. Dan could outmaneuver the entrenched establishment.
This approach, however, would demand a clear vision, sharp messaging, rapid institutional reform, strong coalition-building skills and symbolic breaks with the past. If successful, it could not only redefine Romania’s political trajectory but also bring an end to the managed democracy model altogether.
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