The future of the Russian Navy
Despite submarine strength, Russia’s navy struggles with obsolescence, strategic setbacks and dwindling seaborne relevance.
In a nutshell
- Russia’s submarine fleet remains the navy’s core strength
- NATO expansion and Arctic tensions test Russia’s naval deterrence
- Black Sea and Mediterranean losses hinder Russian naval power projection
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Russia prides itself on having the third-largest navy in the world, after the United States and China. It is different from the U.S. Navy in the sense of having no carrier strike groups that can project power across the world, but it is still a formidable force.
In the run-up to this year’s celebration of Navy Day, planned for July 27, its various fleets staged drills in the Baltic and Caspian Seas and in the Arctic and Pacific Oceans. Titled “July Storm,” the operations involved more than 150 ships and over 15,000 troops. The overriding question looking forward concerns how much of the Russian Navy’s formally impressive might would be effective in an actual confrontation today.
The choice to abstain from building a “blue water” navy – one which can operate globally – was made in the Soviet era and it remains a guiding principle. In contrast to China, which has embarked on building its own carriers, modern-day Russia has not. Its surface vessels are built mainly for coastal operations, including amphibious landings, and to serve as missile platforms.
Although the Northern Fleet did inherit two capital ships from the Soviet Navy, neither has been of much use. The heavy battle cruiser Petr Veliky has spent most of its time undergoing repairs, and Russia’s sole aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov was recently written off as scrap, having spent years attracting ridicule for its abysmal performance, including having to be always accompanied by an ocean-going tugboat.
Submarines are Moscow’s strategic bet
The real power of the modern Russian Navy is vested in its submarine force. Strategic nuclear submarines, known as “boomers” in American parlance, make up an important part of Russia’s nuclear deterrent. Considerable funds have also been allocated to ensure that parity is maintained with the American adversary. In July, President Vladimir Putin called for a further expansion of the submarine fleet.
In addition to the nuclear submarines, the Russian Navy also operates nuclear-powered Yasen-class attack submarines that can carry 32 Kalibr cruise missiles and 24 Oniks anti-ship missiles. Out of a planned series of 12, half have been completed and three are under construction. The first two of an upgraded Yasen-M design entered service in 2021. That version may also be equipped with Zircon hypersonic cruise missiles.
The real power of the modern Russian Navy is vested in its submarine force.
Much like the Borei submarines are not considered equal with the American Ohio-class nuclear submarines that carry 24 Trident missiles and have longer range, the Yasen is not up to par with the U.S. Navy’s Virginia-class submarine, held to be one of the most advanced nuclear-powered fast attack boats ever built. Nevertheless, both are still viewed by the U.S. Navy as considerable threats. The Yasen has been deemed by the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence to be the least detectable of Russian – and Chinese – nuclear submarines.
The Russian Navy also operates older conventional submarines like the Kilo class, which has been an important platform for the launch of Kalibr cruise missiles against Ukraine. Among its surface ships, the most important are the Admiral Gorshkov-class frigates that carry missiles similar to the Yasen submarine.
Pageantry masking challenges
Given how poorly Russian missile technology has performed against Western air defense systems in Ukraine, there are grounds to question how effective missiles like the Bulava or indeed the Zircon would be in actual combat against NATO. But the problem for the Russian Navy is broader than just substandard missile technology. A functioning navy requires secure and well-maintained basing areas, along with industrial capacity to build new ships and to maintain existing hulls. The war against Ukraine has cast doubt on all of this.
The message was driven home when Russia canceled this year’s Navy Day citing security concerns after drone attacks overnight. The annual event had already been cancelled in 1980 before being reintroduced in 2017, with President Putin requesting that the reinstated version feature a two-hour fleet parade along the Neva river. Officially known as the Main Naval Parade, it passes through the central parts of St. Petersburg, where media and dignitaries may enjoy the show, and then proceeds to the naval base at Kronstadt, on Kotlin Island, which guards the approach to the former imperial capital city.
Facts & figures
Key locations for the Russian Navy
In recent years, the naval parade has been a major event, showcasing the power of the Russian Navy and attracting participation both by foreign dignitaries and by naval vessels from friendly nations. In addition to the main parade through St. Petersburg, parades and fleet reviews have also been held at the headquarters of the five different fleets, from Severomorsk in the north and Kaliningrad in the Baltic, to Sevastopol in the Black Sea, Astrakhan in the Caspian Sea and Vladivostok on the Pacific coast.
This year, the canceled parade was replaced by an orchestra and by President Putin appearing on video link, hailing the “bravery” and “heroism” of Russian marine infantry units that are fighting in Ukraine. The move reflects that the Russian Navy is stretched to its limits and faces genuine conventional threats – in short, its outlook is not rosy.
Major hits to Russian naval power
The first nail in the coffin of the country’s naval prowess was hammered in shortly after the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine, in February 2022. On April 22, Ukraine used two of its own Neptune missiles to attack and sink the flagship of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, the cruiser Moskva. Since then, Ukraine has destroyed the bulk of that fleet and driven the remainder to remote bases at Novorossiysk and in the Sea of Azov. It is striking that the battle for control over the Black Sea was won by a country that has no navy of its own.
The impact of the demise of the Black Sea Fleet was exacerbated by the collapse, at the end of 2024, of the regime of Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad. The main consequence was that Russia lost access to the naval base at Tartus, which had been its main naval base in the Mediterranean since 1971. Russia’s ability to project force in that region has consequently been curtailed, though Moscow is seeking replacement naval bases in Libya and Sudan.
The second nail in the coffin came when Sweden and Finland were prodded into abandoning their long-standing neutrality. Their decisions to join NATO effectively cornered the remaining assets of the Russian Baltic Fleet. Although Russia may still hold naval drills in the Baltic, drills that aim to inspire fear of armed confrontation, in a shooting war those vessels would not be able to leave their moorings.
Ships at the naval base at Kronstadt would not only have to run the gauntlet of anti-ship missile batteries on the coasts of Finland and Estonia. They would also have to face the ultra-silent Swedish submarine force. The threat from ships based at Baltiysk, in the once heavily fortified Kaliningrad exclave, was recently written off by the American General Chris Donahue. Speaking in July, he said that in a crisis, NATO forces could capture Kaliningrad “in a time frame that is unheard of and faster than we’ve ever been able to do.” In advance of a crisis, NATO submarines would also stealthily mine the approaches to both Kronstadt and Baltiysk.
As the smallest of the five Russian navies, the Caspian Flotilla has been quite effective in launching cruise missiles at civilian targets in Ukraine, but in a regional conflict that involves Azerbaijan (and Turkiye) it would be nullified.
Read more on the Russian Navy
- The outlook for Russia’s navy
- The Arctic in Russia’s crosshairs
- The Russian strategy in the Mediterranean
This leaves the country’s two main fleets, the Northern Fleet and the Pacific Fleet. The former lies at the center of the escalating tensions in the Arctic. The deadly games that were played between the U.S. and Soviet navies during the Cold War are still ongoing. American fast-attack submarines are still believed to be loitering around the approaches to the Russian submarine bases on the Kola Peninsula, ready to track and destroy its nuclear submarines if they try to venture out into the Atlantic.
Russia’s strategic situation has deteriorated considerably. It is not enough that the accession of Sweden and Finland to NATO has resulted in the basing areas on the Kola Peninsula now being precariously close to NATO territory. Increasing tensions in the Arctic and around Norway’s Svalbard archipelago will also lead to increased NATO presence. By enhancing the threat against the Northern Fleet, it will erode a vital part of Russia’s nuclear deterrence.
The Pacific Fleet finds itself in a very different position from that of the Northern Fleet. Its basing areas are at a secure distance from NATO assets. Its closest neighbor is China and its relations with the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy have developed in a positive spirit over the past decade. However, where the Russian Navy was once the mentor and patron of its neighbor, today it is clearly the PLA Navy that has the upper hand.
Scenarios
Most likely: Russian Navy to continue provocations
The most likely scenario in the short term is that tensions continue to escalate and that Russia keeps punching above its weight. Although its military would stand little to no chance against NATO in a conventional war, it can still bank on being able to push the envelope by taking each new provocation just a bit further. Naval vessels will continue escalating the deadly rain of cruise missiles over Ukraine, and surface vessels have already been spotted riding shotgun for ships in the “shadow fleet” that some European countries have begun sanctioning. As tensions rise around Svalbard, this will offer yet another stage for escalating naval provocations.
The main problem with this scenario is that it cannot be sustained beyond the short term. It will either escalate into a full-scale shooting war or it will peter out into growing irrelevance for whatever Russian ships remain afloat and seaworthy.
Unlikely: Russia enters conflict with NATO, pairs with China for Taiwan
The nightmare scenario is that current tensions between Russia and NATO do escalate into a hot war. For the Russian Navy this would not only mean an effective end of its navies in the Baltic and the Black Seas. It would also lead to serious confrontations around the basing areas on the Kola Peninsula, confrontations that might escalate to nuclear exchange. It could also see the Pacific Fleet operating together with the PLA Navy, perhaps even in a Chinese move against Taiwan. Although this scenario must still be considered highly unlikely, it does feed into strategic planning.
Unlikely: Russian Navy atrophies, Pacific Fleet becomes a Chinese tool
At the other extreme lies slow death. Experience from the demise of the Black Sea Fleet has shown that many naval vessels are little more than rust buckets kept afloat to maintain revenue streams for various corrupt officials. Another experience from Ukraine is that only days after the commissioning of the Knyaz Pozharsky, its military intelligence revealed it had gained access to a wide range of information about the Russian Navy’s most formidable ship, down to crew lists and operating schedules.
The most important question concerns whether the Russian economy will be able to maintain the construction of new ships, having lost the engineering capabilities it used to depend on in Ukraine. As the economic crisis deepens, it may perhaps not even be able to maintain and repair remaining hulls. The negative outlook on this count is exacerbated by the added question of what foreign powers will retain interest in Russian naval technology following some Indian disappointments. While North Korea is clearly interested, the key question concerns if Russia still has any technology left that is of interest to China. The likelihood of the once formidable Russian Pacific Fleet ending up as an auxiliary to the PLA Navy may still remain a long shot, but to Russian planners it must be a chilling prospect indeed.
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